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COMMENT
ILLINOIS V. GATES: BROADENING THE STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON
INFORMANTS' TIPS
Police utilization of informants" tips in the investigation of criminal activity
presents the courts with complex fourth amendment issues.2 The fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution guarantees individuals the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officers.' The
1. See M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 40 (2d ed. 1968).
Informants' tips aid police in their investigation and apprehension of criminals. Id.The infor-
mant is usually someone in the criminal community or close enough to the fringes of criminal
activity to obtain accurate information. Id. Individuals become informants for a variety of reasons.
See Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful
Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 712-13 (1972). Motives for an individual becoming an informant
include an offer to the individual of immunity or sentence reduction in exchange for information,
revenge directed at a criminal competitor, or offers of money payments in exchange for informa-
tion. Id.
2. See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 509, 313 A.2d 847, 849 (1973) (defining law
concerning probable cause for warrants based on informants' tips as "murky" and in need of
explication). Prior to the recent Supreme Court case of Illinois v. Gates, courts employed dif-
ferent standards in determining the extent of factual information required for a magistrate to
base a finding of probable cause on an informant's tip. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2328 (1983) (Court held that magistrate should determine probable cause for warrant based on
informant's tip through examination of "totality of the circumstances"); infra text accompanying
notes 42-50 (examination of totality of the circumstances analysis); accord United States v. Harris,
403 U.S. 573, 581 (1971) (Court employed "substantial basis for crediting" standard for deter-
mining whether informant's tip supported finding of probable cause); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114 (1964) (magistrate may base finding of probable cause on informant's tip if affiant
provides evidence of informant's veracity and basis of informant's knowledge). Prior to Gates,
courts also differed on the probative value of an anonymous tip as opposed to a tip from a
source known to police in a determination of probable cause. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329
(anonymous tip may support finding of probable cause); Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 535, 313 A.2d
at 863 (same). But see United States v. McLeroy, 584 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1978) (magistrate
may not base finding of probable cause on an anonymous informant's tip); United States v.
Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (same). See generally LaFave, Probable Cause
for Informants: The Effect of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 J. ILL.
L.F. 1, 2 (issue of probable cause based on information supplied by informant has resulted in
confusion and conflict among courts).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment protects persons, their houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing that warrants should issue
only following a finding of probable cause. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 6 & 8 (defining
probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest). Fourth amendment protections extend
only to conduct initiated pursuant to governmental authority. See Coolidge v. United States,
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not extend to searches and seizures conducted by private individuals); Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921) (drafters intended fourth amendment to restrain only governmental
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Supreme Court has held that a search or seizure conducted without a warrant
is unreasonable per se unless the intrusion is one of a limited number of clearly
specified judicial exceptions to the warrant requirement.4 Absent a judicially
mandated exception, a magistrate must find probable cause for a search or
seizure to be reasonable.' Probable cause to search exists when circumstances
in a given situation are sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to
believe that the area that police intend to search contains contraband or in-
criminating evidence.6 Probable cause to arrest 7 exists when the circumstances
in a given situation lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the
suspect has committed or is committing an offense.9
A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable cause deter-
mination in any warrant proceeding.9 The Supreme Court has held that re-
activities and did not extend fourth amendment's application to searches and seizures conducted
by private individuals).
4. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (subject to series of clearly defined
exceptions, search is unreasonable per se unless conducted pursuant to warrant properly sup-
ported by probable cause). The Supreme Court has established thirteen exceptions to the warrant
requirement. See Note, Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause in Automobile Search Cases:
A Validity Checklist for Police, Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys, 40 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.
361, 362 n.10 (1983) (thirteen exceptions to warrant requirement are: inventory search of vehicles,
hot pursuit, border and customs searches, searches of highly regulated businesses, stop and frisk,
abandoned property, emergency aid, consent, seizure of items in plain view, fire and homicide
investigations, detention facilities, search incident to arrest, and vehicle search).
5. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (probable cause standard reflects
relevant factors of fourth amendment reasonableness requirement); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (probable cause requirement implemented to protect citizens from
rash and unreasonable intrusions).
6. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (probable cause to search
standards requires more than mere suspicion); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
In Carroll, the Supreme Court held that the amount of evidence needed to find probable cause
was less than the amount needed to justify conviction. Id. at 161-62. The evidence necessary
to sustain a finding of probable cause, however, had to be greater than the good faith belief
of the officer that the seizable items were in the place to be searched. Id.
7. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (arrest
is seizure of person that fourth amendment allows). Courts have defined arrest as the restriction
of a person's liberty by law enforcement agents to the extent that the suspect may not voluntarily
leave the custody of the agents. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969) (time of arrest
measure at moment when suspect was no longer free to move); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 103 (1959) (arrest defined as restriction of suspects' freedom of movement). But see Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court held that a brief stop of the suspect by police,
pat of the suspect's outer clothing, and seizure of an item concealed inside the clothing did not
constitute an arrest. Id. at 26. The Terry Court stated that although all arrests are seizures, all
seizures are not necessarily arrests. Id. at 27.
8. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (officer's knowledge of petitioner and peti-
tioner's previous record of criminality did not satisfy probable cause to arrest requirements);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103-04 (1959) (affidavit failed to meet probable cause to
arrest standard when only evidence available to officers was petitioner's carrying of package in
neighborhood where theft of number of similarly shaped packages had occurred).
9. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958) (fourth amendment protec-
tions dictate that only neutral and detached magistrate may determine the existence of probable
cause from facts of case); Johnson v. United States, 333 U:S. 10, 14 (1948) (neutral and detached
magistrate must determine probable cause, not police officer who is engaged in business of crime
prevention); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the justice
of the peace who made the probable cause determination was also the potential prosecuting attorney.
[Vol. 41:327
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quiring a neutral and detached magistrate to determine probable cause is
necessary to protect adequately the fourth amendment rights of an individual.'I
Magistrates face a complicated task when the affidavit in support of the warrant
relies primarily on a confidential informant's tip."
In Aguilar v. Texas 2 the Supreme Court developed a two-prong test for
determining the existence of probable cause based on informants' tips. 3 The
Aguilar text provided specific evidentiary standards that affidavits must meet
to support a finding of probable cause.' The first prong of the Aguilar test
required that the affidavit provide facts demonstrating the informant's basis
of knowledge in obtaining the information.' The Aguilar Court noted that
information revealing an informant's sources and relating the informant's
methods for obtaining facts and drawing conclusions provided the means for
establishing the informant's basis of knowledge.' 6
Id. at 450. The Coolidge Court held that the justice of the peace was not neutral and that the
search was per se unreasonable. Id.
10. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). The Johnson Court ruled that an
individual's right to privacy must at times yield to a law enforcement agent's right to search.
Id. at 14. Generally, only a neutral and detached magistrate, and not law enforcement agents,
should decide when the necessity of a search justifies an intrusion upon an individual's right
to privacy. Id. This rule, however, is not absolute. See supra text note 4 (discussion of exceptions
to warrant requirement).
11. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983) (advocating totality of the circumstances
analysis as correct test for determining probable cause based on informant's tip); infra text ac-
companying notes 73-76 (examination of Gates totality of the circumstances analysis). But see
Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 523, 313 A.2d 847, 857 (separate examination by magistrate
of informant's basis of knowledge and veracity was proper probable cause analysis); infra text
accompanying notes 54-60 (examination of Stanley court's severability analysis). See generally
Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper
Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. Cium. L. REv. 99, 108-13 (1982) (discussion of difficulties
encountered by lower courts in weighing confidential informants' tips in probable cause deter-
minations) [hereinafter cited as Anonymous Tips].
12. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
13. Id. at 114. In Aguilar, Houston police applied for a warrant to search the home of
the petitioner. Id. at 109. The police officers submitted an affidavit in support of the application.
Id. The affidavit stated that a reliable informant had alerted the officers to the possibility that
the petitioner had narcotics in his house. Id. Based on the affidavit, the local Justice of the Peace
issued the search warrant. Id. The police entered the home of the petitioner and arrested the
petitioner as he attempted to dispose of a packet of narcotics. Id. at 110. The trial court admitted
the evidence obtained through the search over the objection of the petitioner. Id. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. See Aguillar v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 629,
631, 362 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1962). The United States Supreme Court overturned the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals by holding that the affidavit failed to demonstrate a sufficient amount of
basis of knowledge evidence to enable the magistrate to determine probable cause. 378 U.S. at
116. The Supreme Court further ruled that all evidence that the police obtained from the search
was inadmissible. Id. at 115-16.
14. 378 U.S. at 114.
15. Id. The Aguilar Court stated that the affidavit had to set forth the underlying cir-
cumstances that formed the basis of the informant's knowledge regarding the location and quan-
tity of narcotics. Id.
16. See Id. at 113, quoting (Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958) The
most persuasive form of basis of knowledge evidence is information that the informant obtains
through first-hand observation. See State v. Archer, 23 Ariz. App. 584, 534 P.2d 1083 (1975).
In Archer, the informant was an accomplice to the crime that police were investigating. Id. at
1984]
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The Aguilar Court emphasized the importance of establishing the basis
of the informant's knowledge, stating the basis of knowledge evidence pro-
vides the magistrate with sufficient information to determine that the infor-
mant obtained his information in a reliable of manner.' 7 The Court reasoned
that evidence relating to the informant's method for obtaining the informa-
tion allowed the magistrate to minimize the possibility that the informant's
source of the information was not rumor or general reputation.18 The Aguilar
Court held that absent a showing that the informant had not based his
testimony on mere rumor, a magistrate cannot make a proper evaluation of
whether sufficient probable cause exists for a warrant to issue.' 9 The Court
reasoned that the actions of a magistrate without adequate basis of knowledge
evidence would amount to nothing more than blind approval of conclusions
that either police officers or informants drew from potentially unreliable or
inaccurate information."0 The Aguilar Court concluded that a magistrate who
approves the evaluations of a police officer without considering the basis on
which the officer derives his conclusions has abdicated his constitutional obliga-
tion to be a neutral and detached arbiter of probable cause. 21
- 534 P.2d at 1085. The informant claimed that he obtained the information contained in
the tip through his role as an accomplice to the crime. Id. at -, 534 P.2d at 1085. The Court
of Appeals of Arizona held that the first-hand information presented by the informant clearly
satisfied the basis of knowledge prong. Id. at -, 534 P.2d at 1085-86. See United States v.
Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1973) (court held that affiant also must demonstrate
third party's basis of knowledge). See generally LAFAvE, supra note 2, at 35-42 (examination
of various judicial interpretations of probative value of first-hand observation in probable cause
determinations).
17. 378 U.S. at 114-15. The Court in Aguilar implied that the basis of knowledge require-
ment preserved the rule established in Giordenello v. United States. See id. at 115; Giordenello,
357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). In Giordenello, the affidavit failed to provide the source of the infor-
mation on which the affiant based his conclusion of criminal activity. Id. at 486. Without the
basis of knowledge information, the magistrate could not weigh accurately the facts to make
a proper probable cause determination. Id. at 486-87.
18. See 378 U.S. at 113-14; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969) (Court re-
quired sufficient basis of knowledge evidence to ensure that magistrate would determine probable
cause on something more substantial than underworld rumor).
19. See 378 U.S. at 112 (magistrate cannot make proper probable cause determination unless
affiant supplies magistrate with adequate underlying facts); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S.
41 (1933). In Nathanson the affidavit stated the affiant's suspicion that the suspect was engaged
in criminal activity. Id. at 44-45. The affidavit provided no information regarding the investiga-
tions or observations of the officer. Id. at 46. The Court held that a warrant that a magistrate
issued solely on the basis of the officer's suspicion without any evidence supporting that suspi-
cion was invalid. Id. at 47.
20. 378 U.S. at 114; see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). In Ventresca,
the affidavit stated that the affiants obtained information about the suspect from personal knowledge
and from other agents. 380 U.S. at 104. Further, the affidavit recounted in detail incidents in
which the agents observed the suspect engaging in illegal or suspicious activity. Id. The Supreme
Court found that the affidavit contained sufficient basis of knowledge information to support
a probable cause determination. Id. at 111. The Court emphasized, however, that affidavits based
solely on the affiant's conclusions may not support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 108-09.
The Ventresca Court stated that without evidence of underlying circumstances, the magistrate
becomes a "rubber stamp" of the police. Id. at 109.
21. 378 U.S. at 115. The Aguilar Court held that the constitution requires that a neutral
and detached magistrate determine probable cause. Id. The Aguilar Court stated further that
[Vol. 41:327
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The basis of knowledge prong enunciated in Aguilar is not unique to the
evaluation of warrants that a magistrate issues on the basis of an informant's
tip. 2  In any warrant situation, the requirement that the affiant supply the
magistrate with basis of knowledge evidence exists to ensure that the magistrate
will make an accurate, detached probable cause determination.23 For example,
when an affiant/officer bases the affidavit solely on personal knowledge and
observation rather than on an informant's testimony, the affiant/officer must
nonetheless provide adequate information indicating the method by which the
officer derived the information to allow the magistrate to properly determine
probable cause. 4 Additionally, the fact that an informant's tip provides the
basis for a warrant affidavit does not require the magistrate to apply a more
stringent standard of proof for the basis of knowledge test than if the af-
fiant/officer bases the affidavit on personal knowledge.15 The constitutional
rationale for requiring an officer to relate the sources of his information is
that a neutral, detached, and informed magistrate is more competent to deter-
mine probable cause than a biased police officer seeking a conviction.
2 6
The second prong of the Aguilar test, the veracity prong, specifically per-
tained to the truthfulness of affidavits based on informants' tips by requiring
the affiant to offer additional facts establishing the credibility of the infor-
mant or the reliability of his information. 7 In situations in which the affiant
reports his own observations and investigations, the oath or affirmation of
the affiant ensures the veracity of the affidavit. 28 In contrast, the Aguilar Court
a magistrate's mere approval of the conclusion of the police officer allows the officer to become
the determinor of probable cause. Id.; see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (fourth
amendment protection is dependent up on magistrate as impartial determinor of probable cause
rather than police officer who is active in competitive enterprise of crime solution); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (same).
22. 378 U.S. at 112-13.
23. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (search warrant based on of-
ficer's suspicion must provide basis of knowledge evidence).
24. See id.
25. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112-14. The basis of knowledge standard is the same regardless
of the source of the affidavit. Compare Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 with Nathanson, 290 U.S. at
47 (Supreme Court requires same basis of knowledge standard for affidavit that officer bases
on either informant's tip or on affiant/officer's personal suspicion).
26. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his Gates
dissent, Justice Brennan stated that a police officer is presumptively reliable. Id. at 2358. Justice
Brennan stated that regardless of a police officer's reliability, the officer could no more properly
determine probable cause than a presumptively unreliable confidential informant. Id.
27. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969)
(affidavit based on informant's tip requires extra factual information that demonstrates veracity
of information). The affiant need not identify the informant despite the fact that the informant's
veracity was in question. See 378 U.S. at 114; Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1964) (proceeding to determine probable cause does not require disclosure of informant's identity).
28. See United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977). In Turner, the Second Circuit
stated that the purpose of the oath or affirmation was to ensure that the affiant was telling the
truth. Id. at 50. The Turner court stated than the rationale behind the use of the oath or affirma-
tion was that the moral, legal, or religious significance to the affiant of the oath or affirmation
would increase the likelihood that the affiant was being truthful. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. amend.
IV (warrant will not issue absent determination of probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion of affiant); supra note 3 (explanation of general purposes of fourth amendment).
1984]
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found that the oath of the affiant could not ensure the veracity of the af-
fidavit when evidence supplied by an absent informant formed the basis of
the affidavit.29 Therefore, in situations involving informants' tips, the Aguilar
Court held that the affiant had to supply underlying facts that pertained to
the informant's truthfulness in order to ensure the veracity of the affidavit.3"
In Spinelli v. United States,3 the Supreme Court noted that the Eighth
Circuit's confused application of the Aguilar holding justified a further ex-
plication of the two-prong test.32 In his concurring opinion to Spinelli, Justice
White elaborated on the Aguilar decision by delineating specific cures for af-
fidavits that failed either or both prongs of the Aguilar test. 3 The first Spinelli
cure addressed the problem of affidavits that failed to provide adequate basis
of knowledge evidence.3" Justice White stated that a sufficient level of detail
29. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (in
evaluating information supplied by informant, magistrate must find sufficient supporting evidence
about informant to reduce possibility of untrustworthy testimony).
30. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. The most common type of underlying fact utilized to
prove the veracity of an informant is the past reliability of the informant in similar situations.
See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967). In McCray, the police officer testified that
he had known the informant for approximately two years. Id. at 304. During that two-year period,
the informant supplied information to the officer approximately twenty-five times. Id. The tips
subsequently led to a number of convictions. Id. The McCray Court concluded that the past
performance of the informant assured that the information the informant supplied was trustworthy.
Id.
31. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli v. United States, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri found the petitioner guilty of illegal interstate gambling activities.
Id. at 411-12. The district court convicted Spinelli for travelling from Illinois to Missouri with
the intent to conduct illegal gambling activities. Id. at 411; see 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976) (federal
statute prohibiting interstate gambling activities). The execution of a search warrant that the
magistrate granted on the basis of a confidential informant's tip provided the police with evidence
that resulted in the petitioner's conviction. 393 U.S. at 411. The search warrant affidavit alleged
that the petitioner was a bookmaker conducting business from from two phones in an apartment
in St. Louis. Id. at 413-14. Specifically, the affidavit stated that a confidential informant had
alerted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the petitioner's illegal book-making activity.
Id. at 414. The informant provided the numbers of the two phones allegedly located in the peti-
tioner's apartment. Id. The FBI agents corroborated all of the informant's facts except the con-
clusion that the suspect was conducting illegal bookmaking activities. Id. at 413. The agents observed
the petitioner crossing the Illinois-Missouri border on four occasions. Id. The agents also observed
the petitioner enter the apartment building that the informant claimed to house the bookmaking
operation. Id. Finally, the FBI agents corroborated the phone numbers mentioned in the tip.
Id. at 414.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the petitioner's conviction. See 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967) (en
banc). The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Eighth Circuit, stating that the affidavit
was insufficient to establish probable cause. 393 U.S. at 412. The Surpeme Court held that the
affidavit failed both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs of the Aguilar test. Id. at 417-18.
32. 393 U.S. at 412. In Spinelli, the Court cited that the confusion of the lower courts
and the great number of cases involving warrants based on informants' tips motivated the Court
to re-examine the Aguilar test. Id. The Court stated that a magistrate must evaluate an informant's
tip in light of the two-prong analysis of the Aguilar test. Id. at 415. If the magistrate determines
that the tip is inadequate to support a finding of probable cause, the affiant may buttress the
tip with certain specific information. Id.
33. Id. at 425-28 (White, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 425 (White, J., concurring).
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ILLINOIS V. GATES
in the informant's tip could compensate for an affiant's failure to satisfy the
requirements of the basis of knowledge prong." Justice White reasoned that
specificity of detail in a tip supported an inference that the informant had
based the tip on personal observation.3 6 Justice White concluded that the in-
ference of personal observation satisfied the requirement of the basis of
knowledge prong.
37
Justice White's concurrence also elaborated on the majority's holding that
independent police corroboration of specific facts provided by the informant
could establish the informant's reliability and therefore buttress a defective
veracity prong of the Aguilar test.38 Justice White explained that verification
by police of some facts in the informant's tip lent credence to the unverified
facts.3 9 White stated that the corroboration of some facts, in addition to the
implied accuracy of the unverified facts could prove the informant's
truthfulness, thereby satisfying the veracity prong's requirement that the af-
fiant provide evidence pertaining to the reliability of the informant.4
35. Id. (White, J., concurring). In Spinelli, Justice White stated that self-verifying details
could cure a defective affidavit only when the affidavit had already satisfied the veracity prong
of the Aguilar test. Id. Justice White defined self-verifying detail as detail specific enough to
support an inference of personal observation by the informant, thereby satisfying the basis of
knowledge prong. Id. at 426. Justice White cited the facts of Draper v. United States as an example
of the type of detail necessary to buttress a defective basis of knowledge prong. Id. at 420; see
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 308-09 (1959); infra text accompanying notes 96-101 (facts
of Draper affidavit). The tip in Draper included details of the suspect's travel itinerary and physical
appearance. 358 U.S. at 309. The physical description of the suspect included his height, weight,
clothing, and the color of a bag that the suspect would be carrying. Id.
36. 393 U.S. at 425. (White, J., concurring) In his Spinelli concurrence, Justice White based
the inference that the informant provided evidence derived from personal observation on the
assumption that a person ordinarily does not obtain minutely detailed information through casual,
day-to-day conversation. Id. at 425-26. Justice White surmised that an informant gains detailed
information only through a reliable method such as personal observation. Id.
37. Id. at 426. (White, J., concurring) In his concurring opinion to Spinelli, Justice White
stated that, assuming the affidavit contained information sufficient to satisfy the veracity prong,
the inference of personal observation satisfied the basis of knowledge prong. Id. The inference
of personal observation allowed a finding of probable cause. Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 16 (probative effect of personal observation on basis of knowledge examination).
38. 393 U.S. at 426-27. (White, J., concurring) In his Spinelli concurrence, Justice White
stated that the verification of facts of the affidavit was probative of the honesty of the informant
because verification insured that the informant was not reporting a fabricated story. Id. at 426.
39. Id. at 427. (White, J., concurring) In Spinelli, Justice White stated that police cor-
roboration could only prove an informant's veracity. Id. The rationale used by Justice White
to find that police corroboration could establish an informant's veracity was that because the
police proved that the information was correct regarding some facts, the informant is more likely
to be right on allegations of illegal activity as well. Id. Justice White stressed that police cor-
roboration of an informant's tip alone cannot establish probable cause. Id. White stated that
if police corroborated nine facts supplied by an informant, the corraboration did not justify a
finding of probable cause on the unverified conclusion. Id. White stated that although the infor-
mant was accurate on the facts, thereby satisfying the veracity prong, the corroboration could
not provide the magistrate with sufficient basis of knowledge evidence to evaluate the informant's
conclusions. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 94-113 (examination of use of police cor-
roboration as basis of knowledge evidence).
40. 393 U.S. at 427. Courts have differed on the question of whether the police should
19841
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A major interpretative difficulty of the Aguilar-Spinelli test for courts
was whether a magistrate must sever the two prongs of the test or evaluate
the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant interdependently by an
assessment of the "totality of the circumstances.""' Under the totality of the
corroborate incriminating facts or seemingly innocent facts to meet the Spinelli requirement. See
Comment, Anonymous Tips supra note 11 at 101 (type of fact that must be corroborated to
buttress informant's veracity is area of conflicting judicial interpretation). Some courts have held
that corroboration of innocent facts, which on their face would not incriminate a suspect, satisfies
the Aguilar veracity prong. See, e.g., United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 490 (5th Cir.
1978) (corroboration of physical descriptions, addresses, phone numbers, and automobiles satisfied
test for informant's reliability), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979); United States v. Ashley, 569
F.2d 975, 982 (5th Cir.) (FBI corroboration of innocent facts is sufficient to establish informant's
reliability), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d 1224, 1230-31
(2d Cir. 1972) (same). Courts adhering to the innocent fact standard state that a demand for
a stricter standard misinterprets the purpose of police corroboration. See United States v. Ashley,
569 F.2d 975, 981-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978). In Ashley, the Fifth Circuit
held that corroboration of innocent facts supports an inference that the informant is truthful.
Id. at 982. The innocent facts corroborated by the police in Ashley were a description of both
the suspect and the automobile the suspect was driving. Id. The Ashley court stated that the
purpose of corroboration of informants' facts was to buttress the reliability of the informant,
not to establish probable cause. Id. at 983. The court concluded, therefore, that corroboration
of innocent facts demonstrates the informant's ability to tell the truth as adequately as corroboration
of incriminating facts. Id.
Other courts have held that police corroboration of innocent facts is inadequate to cure a
defective veracity prong. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971). In Whitely, the Supreme
Court held that police must corroborate facts directly related to the crime to buttress a defective
veracity prong. Id. at 567. The rationale for requiring corroboration of incriminating facts to
prove an informant's veracity is that corroboration of innocent facts does not offer sufficient
reliability to support a finding of probable cause since the corroborated facts are accessible to
the general public. See LaFave, supra note 2, at 55 (view that innocent fact corroboration inade-
quately protects fourth amendment rights). But see Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d
847 (1974). The Stanley court disputed the incriminating fact requirement by noting that suffi-
cient corroboration of incriminating details establishes probable cause without the tip. Id. at 528,
313 A.2d at 860. Corroboration of incriminating details therefore takes the affidavit out of the
Spinelli context by rendering the informant's tip superfluous. Id. at 528, 313 A.2d at 860; see
United States v. Doty, 714 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1983) (independent police corroboration of
incriminating fact of possession of marijuana with intent to sell constituted probable cause).
Other coiqrts have established a middle ground approach to the fact corroboration issue.
See United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977).
This intermediate, or "pipeline" theory requires that the information corroborated demonstrate
ihe informant's personal connection to the criminal activity. Id. at 757-58. In Montgomery, the
Fifth Circuit held that police corroboration of the time that the suspect would be leaving both
the motel and the city demonstrated a knowledge of private facts that ensured the reliability
of the informant. Id. at 757; see United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1975)
(corroboration of totally innocent information may satisfy defective veracity prong if information
is not subject of public knowledge).
41. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1973) (quantum of underlying
circumstances and informant's reliability are main issues in totality of the circumstances analysis),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 523, 313 A.2d 847, 857
(1974) (basis of knowledge and veracity of informant are independent requirements in probable
cause determination). See generally, Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause" An Aguilar and Spinelli
Primer, 25 MERCER L. RV. 741, 774-81 (1974) (discussing specific purposes and independent
nature of two Aguilar-Spinelli prongs).
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circumstances approach, the magistrate does not analyze the two prongs of
the Aguilar-Spinelli test as distinct requirements. 42 The magistrate instead
analyzes the basis of knowledge and veracity evidence together to formulate
a nontechnical probable cause determination.4 3 The purpose of the totality
of the circumstances test is to increase the discretion of the magistrate by
allowing him to make a practical, common sense probable cause determina-
tion free from overly technical rules and analyses.
44
The implementation of the totality of the circumstances analysis has
resulted in magistrates relying on independent police corroboration, which
under Justice White's analysis in Spinelli police could use only to buttress
insufficient proof of an informant's reliability,," as evidence of an informant's
basis of knowledge.46 The rationale for the use of police corroboration as basis
of knowledge as well as veracity evidence is that the corroboration may lead
to an inference that the informant observed the activity first-hand.47 A second
result of the totality of the circumstances analysis is that courts have found
that a strong determination of an informant's veracity alone is sufficient
evidence to support probable cause, without any further demonstration of the
informant's basis of knowledge. 8 Reviewing courts have justified a finding
42. See Sellers, 483 F.2d at 41. The Sellers court noted that a strong demonstration of
one Aguilar prong could buttress weaker evidence in the other prong. Id.
43. See id.; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (magistrates should examine
warrants in practical, realistic fashion and not rely on specific, technical requirements).
44. See Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1971).
The Gonzales court stated that a magistrate should base his determination of probable cause
on inferences drawn from all the facts rather than technical requirements. Id. at 970.
45. 393 U.S. at 426-27 (White, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 37-39
(explaining rationale of using police corroboration to prove informant's veracity).
46. See United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974). In Anderson, the affiant
reported to the magistrate that the informant had on eight separate occasions provided information
that led to seizures of narcotics. Id. at 1316. The court held that the informant's past satisfied
the veracity prong. Id. Using the totality of the circumstances analysis, the Anderson court further
stated that police corroboration could not only buttress a defective veracity prong, but also could
cure a defective basis of knowledge prong by ensuring that the informant had not based the
tip on rumor or reputation. Id.; United States v. Drew, 436 F.2d 529, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1970)
(corroboration may buttress inadequate basis of knowledge evidence), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 977
(1971).
47. See Anderson, 500 F.2d at 1316. The Anderson court stated that police corroboration
could support an inference that the informant observed the activity first-hand, thereby satisfying
the basis of knowledge prong. Id.; supra note 16 (discussion of probative value of first-hand
observation in basis of knowledge determination). But see infra text accompanying notes 108-113
(description of analytical flaws in allowing corroborations to buttress defective basis of knowledge
prong).
48. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974). In Sellers, the court noted that the informant had supplied police with reliable information
on more than one hundred occasions. Id. at 41. The court determined that such a strong demonstra-
tion of reliability decreased the level of basis of knowledge evidence necessary to support a probable
cause determination. Id., see also United States v. Crawford, 462 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1972)
(strong demonstration of informant's reliability may obviate nced for basis of knowledge evidence),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1973). See supra text accompanying note 30 (example of magistrate's
reliance on informant's past performance to establish reliability).
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of probable cause that a magistrate based exclusively on the informant's
reliability by noting that a rigorous basis of knowledge examination is
superfluous due to the established reliability of the informant."9 Courts have
viewed the rationale of allowing a strength in one prong to counterbalance
a weakness in the other prong as a departure from overly technical probable
cause determinations in favor of a practical, common sense approach to
probable cause.50
The independent, or "severability" approach to applying the Aguilar-
Spinelli test maintains that the Aguilar opinion required the magistrate to make
separate determinations whether sufficient evidence of the informant's sources
existed to support the basis of knowledge prong and whether sufficient evidence
of the informant's honesty existed to support the reliability prong." Under
the severability approach, therefore, a strong showing in one Aguilar prong
may not affect a weaker showing in the other prong.' 2 Courts that advocate
the severability approach prefer the more precise, technical analysis to the
totality of the circumstances test. 3 The Maryland case of Stanley v. State4
clearly explains the severability analysis. In Stanley, the state offered indepen-
dent police corroboration, ordinarily the constitutional cure for an inadequate
demonstration of an informant's veracity, as evidence of the informant's basis
qf knowledge." The Stanley court held that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy
49. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983) (vigorous examination of basis of
knowledge information not necessary when reliability of source is unquestionable); Sellers, 483
F.2d at 41 (same). Although the Gates and Sellers rationale are similar, the basis for establishing
the reliability of the informant differs in each case. Compare Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (informant's
reliability based on honest reputation in community) with Sellers, 483 F.2d at 41 (informant's
reliability based solely on past performance as successful tipster).
50. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (common sense compels finding of probable cause based
on strong showing in one prong); Sellers, 483 F.2d at 41 (same); Gonzalez v. Beto, 425 F.2d
963, 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (evaluations of probable cause by magistrates should be made on basis
of common sense, not technical requirements), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1971); infra text ac-
companying notes 77-81 (explaining common sense rationale for majority holding in Gates).
51. See, e.g., People v. Palanza, 55 IUI. App. 3d 1028, 1031-32, 371 N.E.2d 687, 689 (1978)
(court invalidated warrant issued by magistrate because informant of uncontested veracity failed
to demonstrate adequately basis of his knowledge); Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 513, 313
A.2d 847, 851 (1974) (magistrate must find sufficient evidence in both prongs of Aguilar test
to support finding of probable cause); Dawson v. State, 14 Md. App. 18, 31, 284 A.2d 861,
868 (1971) (same); infra text accompanying notes 52-60 (explaining rationale of separate prong
approach to determinations of probable cause).
52. See Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 522, 313 A.2d at 857.
53. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415. The Spinelli Court held that the Eighth Circuit's totality
of the circumstances approach was too imprecise to determine properly probable cause. Id.
54. 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847 (1974). In Stanley, the evidence supporting the infor-
mant's veracity consisted in part of the affiant's statement that, on two previous occasions, the
informant had given the affiant/officer information which led to the arrest of eight suspects
and the seizure of a considerable amount of marijuana. Id. at 511-13, 313 A.2d at 850-51. The
affidavit, however, offered no evidence demonstrating the informant's basis of knowledge. Id.,
313 A.2d at 851.
55. Id. at 514-15, 313 A.2d at 852. The affiant in Stanley, aware that the basis of knowledge
evidence in the affidavit was probably inadequate, attempted to buttress the evidence of that
prong with evidence of independent police corroboration. Id. at 515, 313 A.2d at 852. The weakness
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the informant's basis of knowledge,5 6 but rejected the state's attempt to use
the police corroborative information as evidence for both prongs. 7 The Stanley
court stated that police corroboration evidence was pertinent only to the deter-
mination of an informant's veracity and inappropriate in a basis of knowledge
evaluation. The court found that the application of the severability approach
was appropriate because each Spinelli remedy applied to a particular Aguilar
prong.9 The Spinelli remedies therefore were not interchangeable because each
prong addressed itself to a different aspect or weakness of the affidavit.60
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a strong
demonstration in one prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test could offset an inade-
quate showing in the other prong to support a magistrate's finding of pro-
bable cause. In Illinois v. Gates,6' Bloomingdale, Illinois police arrested defen-
dants Lance and Sue Gates for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.62
The state obtained the entirety of its evidence from a search of the defendants'
home and car. 63 In issuing the warrant, the magistrate based his finding of
probable cause to search the defendants' home in part on an anonymous let-
ter to the Bloomingdale police outlining the defendants' travel plans and pro-
cedure for transporting narcotics from Florida to Illinois.6" The police cor-
of the basis of knowledge prong stemmed from the absence of information in the affidavit that
the informant had based his information on personal observation or otherwise had obtained the
information in a reliable manner. Id. at 513, 313 A.2d at 851. See infra text accompanying notes
94-106 (examining use of independent police corroboration as basis of knowledge evidence under
totality of the circumstances analysis).
56. 19 Md. App. at 533, 313 A.2d at 863. In Stanley, the court stated that the affidavit
failed to provide any basis of knowledge evidence. Id., 313 A.2d at 863. The court held, however,
that the detail of the tip was sufficiently specific to cure the defective basis of knowledge prong.
Id. at 535, 313 A.2d at 863.
57. Id. at 531-33, 313 A.2d at 861-63.
58. Id. at 531, 313 A.2d at 861-62. The court in Stanley stated that police corroboration
does not ascertain the source of the tip or validate the informant's conclusions. Id., 313 A.2d
at 861-62. The Stanley court added in dictum that the specificity of detail necessary to cure inade-
quate basis of knowledge evidence is not probative of an informant's veracity. Id. at 531-32,
313 A.2d at 862. The court stated that detail in a tip could not prove that an informant was
telling the truth because a creative liar could easily fabricate his tale with elaborate, specific details.
Id. at 533, 313 A.2d at 862.
59. Id., 313 A.2d at 857. The Stanley court re-emphasized that the Spinelli remedy of self-
verifying detail was a direct response to the problem of insufficient basis of knowledge, and
that the Spinelli court specifically designed the remedy of independent police corroboration to
buttress inadequate evidence of an informant's veracity. Id., 313 A.2d at 857. The Stanley court
stated that the use of police corroboration of an informant's tip to satisfy the basis of knowledge
test amounted to "truth serum for an informant whose integrity is in good health but who
desperately needs bifocal lenses." Id., 313 A.2d at 857.
60. Id., 313 A.2d at 857.
61. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
62. Id. at 2326.
63. Id. In Illinois v. Gates, the Bloomingdale police searched the trunk of the petitioners'
automobile, uncovering approxmately three hundred and fifty pounds of marijuana. Id. The police
also searched the Gates' home, finding marijuana, weapons, and other contraband. Id.
64. Id. at 2325. In Gates, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale'police identified
the petitioners as dealers of a significant quantity of narcotics. Id. The letter stated that the first
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roborated Lance Gates' plane reservation, Sue Gates' accommodations in
Florida, and the Gates' time of departure.65
At trial, the defendants filed a motion to quash the warrant and suppress
all evidence that the police had obtained as a result of the search." In their
successful motion to quash, the defendants contended that no sufficient basis
of probable cause existed for a warrant to issue.67 The Illinois state appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court, 6 as did the Supreme Court of
Illinois." 9 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the factual detail of the
anonymous tip lacked the necessary specificity to satisfy the basis of knowledge
prong by the Aguilar-Spinelli test.7" The court explained that because the tip
lacked the necessary level of detail, the magistrate was unable to properly ex-
amine the informant's method of obtaining the information and therefore could
not make an accurate probable cause determination." The Illinois court also
step of the drug transporting procedure used by the Gates couple consisted of Sue Gates driving
the petitioners' car to Florida. Id. Next, Lance Gates would fly to Florida to pick up the car,
which had been loaded with narcotics. Id. In the interim, Sue Gates would have flown back
to Illinois. Id. Lance Gates then would drive back to Illinois alone. Id. The letter stated that
May 3rd was the date of the commencement of the next drug transportation operation and con-
cluded by stating that the Gates' automobile would contain over $100,000 worth of narcotics. Id.
65. Id. The anonymous letter in Gates accurately described Lance Gates' flight to Florida
on May 5th and departure for Illinois the next morning. Id. Further, the letter accurately described
Sue Gates' actions after arriving in Florida. Id. The letter, however, inaccurately stated that Sue
Gates would fly back to Illinois alone. Id. Instead, the police observed Sue Gates returning to
Illinois by car with her husband. Id.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. In Gates, the defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of the search warrant based on the anonymous informant's letter. Id.
67. Id.; see People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), aff'd. 85 I11. 2d
376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) In the motion to quash the warrant,
the defendants in Gates contended that the warrant was invalid due to the failure of the affidavit
to meet the probable cause requirements of Aguilar. Id. at 752-53, 403 N.E.2d at 80. The defen-
dants stated that the affidavit failed both prongs of the Aguilar test by demonstrating neither
the reliability of the anonymous informant nor an adequate basis of the informant's knowledge.
Id. at 753, 403 N.E.2d at 80.
68. See People v. Gates, 82 I1l. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980). In Gates, the Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the holding of the trial court that probable cause did not exist. Id.
at 755, 403 N.E.2d at 81. The appellate court based its holding on the failure of the affidavit
to satisfy the Aguilar basis of knowledge prong. Id.
69. See People v. Gates, 85 I11. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981) (decision of Supreme
Court of Illinois to affirm trial court's grant of motion to quash search, warrant), rev'd 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983).
70. Id. at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893. The Gates court held that the detail of the tip did
not meet the basis of knowledge test requirements discussed by Justice White in Spinelli. See
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1969) (White, J., concurring); supra text accom-
panying notes 33-37 (discussion of use of detail to cure defective basis of knowledge prong).
The Illinois Supreme Court further stated that independent police corroboration could not but-
tress a defective basis of knowledge prong. 85 Ill. 2d at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893; see Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring) (stating that police corroboration is not acceptable basis
of knowledge evidence); supra text accompanying notes 57-60 (same).
71. 85 Ill. 2d at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893. The Gates court held that without basis of
knowledge evidence, the magistrate could not ensure that the informant had not based the tip
on general rumor or reputation. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 17-26 (rationale of basis
of knowledge test is to ensure the informant has viable sources of facts and conclusions).
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held that the facts that the police corroborated were not of an incriminating
nature and therefore could not independently justify a finding of probable
cause.
72
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
in Gates and invalidated the severability interpretation of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test.73 The Court held that the totality of the circumstances analysis was the
proper test for probable cause determinations involving informants' tips.74 The
Gates Court reasoned that the totality of the circumstances analysis more pro-
perly adhered to the common sense principles for determining probable cause
by avoiding rigid, overly technical determinations. 7 The Court criticized the
severability analysis as being the prototype of an overly technical, legalistic
analysis of probable cause. 7
The Gates Courts stated that the informal, hurried context surrounding
the issuance of most warrants exacerbated the difficulties faced by magistrates
when employing the severability analysis. The Gates Court further stated
that the totality of the circumstances analysis would provide magistrates with
the necessary discretionary powers to evaluate the varied situations that occur
while making probable cause determinations." Furthermore, the Gates Court
found that the severability analysis made obtaining a search warrant unduly
burdensome for police.7 9 The Court explained that requiring that an affidavit
72. Id.; see supra note 4 (police corroboration of incriminating facts independently may
support finding of probable cause, thereby taking warrant out of realm of Aguilar-Spinelli context).
73. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
74. Id. at 2327-28. The Gates Court defined the totality of the circumstances analysis as
a consideration of veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge information. Id. at 2328. The
Court emphasized, however, that the various factors are too closely intertwined for a magistrate
to be able to consider them in an independent manner. Id.
75. Id. The Gates Court stated that probable cause is an assessment of factual and practical
probabilities. Id. The Court described probable cause as a fluid concept, changing with each
factual situation. Id. Noting that informants' tips will vary greatly in terms of both investigative
value to police and judicial value to magistrates, the Court emphasized the inapplicability of
rigid legal rules in an area of such diversity. Id. at 2329. The Court concluded that only a flexible,
common sense approach would be adequate for such a broad, diverse concept as probable cause.
Id.; see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (discussing inapplicability of overly
technical judicial analyses in probable cause determinations).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2330. The Gates Court stated that a complex, legalistic test such as the
severability analysis was of little aid to magistrates, who typically are not lawyers. Id. See supra
text accompanying notes 51-60 (discussion of severability analysis).
77. 103 S. Ct. at 2330. Due to the hurried atmosphere surrounding the issuance of war-
rants, courts have held that perfect specificity of detail is not an essential element in a probable
cause determination. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (elaborate specificity
found in common-law pleading has no place in probable cause determinations). Because of the
time limitations and the judicial allowances for less than perfect affidavits or warrant applica-
tions, the Gates Court concluded that the built-in legal subtleties the Gates Court concluded that
the built-in legal subtleties of the severability analysis would not aid a magistrate. 103 S. Ct.
at 2331. The Court therefore stated that a common sense approach to probable cause determina-
tions better suited a magistrate's work environment. Id.
78. Id. at 2333 (totality of the circumstances analysis provides magistrate with greater latitude
to determine probable cause than severability analysis).
79. Id. at 2331. The Gates Court stated that the difficulty encountered by police in obtaining
warrants fostered under the severability analysis served to frustrate the efforts of police. Id. The
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contain sufficient evidence to satisfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test
virtually precluded magistrates from basing a finding of probable cause on
an anonymous informant's tip because the veracity of a person supplying an
anonymous tip is by nature unknowable.8" The Gates Court concluded that
the fourth amendment does not require a standard so strict as to eliminate
such a valuable asset to the police detection of illegal activity."
Justice Brennan's dissent in Gates advocated retention of the severability
analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.82 Justice Brennan refuted the majority's
contention that the severability analysis eliminated police use of anonymous
tips by requiring that affiants demonstrate both adequate basis of knowledge
and veracity evidence. 3 Citing the inherent unreliability of anonymous infor-
mants as justification for the strict probable cause standard, Justice Brennan
stated that only an adequate showing in both Aguilar-Spinelli prongs could
properly protect the fourth amendment rights of an individual." Brennan
posited that the totality of the circumstances analysis reflected the majority's
desire to promote overly aggressive police investigations rather than to protect
citizens' rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures by
officers. 5
Illinois v. Gates represents a clarification of the confused law concerning
probable cause for warrants that a magistrate issues on the basis of an infor-
mant's tip.86 The Gates Court's adoption of the totality of the circumstances
analysis, however, may result in unreasonable, albeit court-approved intru-
sions of persons and private property by police. The totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis permits a magistrate to find probable cause when under
Court concluded that the frustration of the police would result in police officers dispensing with
the warrant process in the hope that an exception to the warrant clause would develop at the
time of the search. Id.
80. Id. at 2332.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that rejection of separate prong analysis
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was unjustified and ill-advised).
83. Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his Gates dissent, Justice Brennan stressed
that the severability analysis could result in a finding of probable cause for an affidavit based
on an anonymous informant's tip. Id. at 2358. Brennan noted that the specific detail of the tip
could satisfy the basis of knowledge prong and that police corroboration could satisfy the veracity
prong, thereby establishing probable cause. Id. at 2356-58.
84. Id. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his Gates dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized
the necessity for rigorous application of the severability analysis when examining anonymous
tips. Id. Justice Brennan stated that magistrates should presume that anonymous informants are
unreliable. Id. Justice Brennan's conclusion rested in part on the inability of police to gain any
information from an anonymous informant subsequent to the tip. Id. Justice Brennan also stated
that a magistrate could presume an informant to be dishonest based on the informant's desire
to remain anonymous. Id.; see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (honest, lawabiding citizen would not hesitate to go before magistrate).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2351.
86. Id. at 2330-31. The Gates Court held that a main function of the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis was to eliminate the intricate seris of evidentiary and analytical rules that
accompanied the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id. The Gates Court believed that the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis more adequately would serve the nonlawyers who determine probable cause. Id.
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the severability analysis a warrant could not issue because the evidence in the
affidavit was inadequate to support one of the Aguilar-Spinelli prongs.87 For
example, the Gates Court stated that a tip from an informant of unquestionable
veracity need not contain adequate basis of knowledge evidence to enable the
magistrate to find probable cause. 88 Under traditional fourth amendment
analysis, the execution of a warrant following a magistrate's finding of pro-
bable cause without considering the basis of the informant's knowledge con-
stituted an unreasonable intrusion.89 The Gates Court, however, dismissed the
traditional analysis by allowing magistrates to base a finding of probable cause
solely on the veracity of the informant. 9 The Gates decision allows a magistrate
to find probable cause without evaluating the source or validity of an infor-
mant's or an officer's conclusions."' By failing to examine the source of the
information, the magistrate abdicates his constitutional obligation to be a
neutral and detached arbiter of probable cause, and reduces the magistrate's
role to that of a "rubber stamp" for the probable cause determinations of
police or informants. 92 The Gates decision therefore allows for unreasonable
searches and seizures by permitting someone other than a neutral and detached
magistrate to determine probable cause. 93
The totality of the circumstances analysis also allows police corrobora-
87. Id. at 2329. The Gates Court held that the failure of an affidavit to satisfy one prong
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test would not preclude a finding of probable cause. Id.
88. Id. The Gates Court offered two examples of informants whose strong demonstrations
of veracity could allow a magistrate to find probable cause despite the absence of basis of knowledge
evidence. Id. The first type is the informant with an impressive reputation among law enforce-
ment officers for supplying accurate information. Id. The second type of informant is the or-
dinary citizen with a reputation in the community as an honest individual. Id. The Gates Court
held that in either situation, the fact that the informant cannot adequately state the basis of
his knowledge will not preclude a magistrate from finding probable cause. Id.
89. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965) (explaining that magistrate
who makes probable cause determination without basis of knowledge evidence fails to be "detached"
and therefore renders invalid probable cause determination); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (search warrant based on affidavit without basis of knowledge facts is invalid,
rendering subsequent search unreasonable); supra text accompanying notes 17-24 (examining history
and constitutional rationale of basis of knowledge prong).
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2329; see supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (Gates Court rationale
for finding probable cause without sufficient basis of knowledge information).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2323 (basis of knowledge information not absolute requirement in pro-
bable cause determination); see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958) (magistrates
use basis of knowledge information to evaluate sources of information).
92. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (affidavit without basis of
knowledge evidence is conclusory affidavit and cannot support finding of probable cause); supra
text accompanying note 17 (magistrate is unable to perform constitutional function as neutral
determinor of probable cause without basis of knowledge information).
See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (probable cause deter-
mination made by biased magistrate is unconstitutional); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 371
(1968) (warrant issued by district attorney was not issued by "neutral and detached" magistrate
and therefore is unconstitutional); Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15 (probable cause determination
drawn by police officer instead of magistrate absent exigent circumstances is invalid); see supra
text accompanying note 9 (probable cause determination made by anyone other than neutral and
detached magistrate is unreasonable under fourth amendment).
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tion to strengthen evidence of an informant's basis of knowledge as well as
veracity and thereby satisfy a determination of probable cause.9 4 Courts that
allow police corroboration as evidence of an informant's basis of knowledge
rely on the theory that police corroboration of the informant's facts ensures
that the informant based his story on something greater than mere rumor or
reputation." The use by courts of police corroboration to satisfy both prongs
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test reflects a misinterpretation of the Spinelli Court's
use of Draper v. United States." In Draper, an informant told Denver, Col-
orado police officers that a suspect would be arriving in Denver by train."
The informant described the suspect and his apparel, and stated that the suspect
would be walking quite rapidly.98 The informant also stated that the suspect
was carrying three ounces of heroin. 99 After corroborating all the details sup-
plied by the informant except the incriminating possession of heroin, the police
arrested the suspect without a warrant. 00 In a pre-Aguilar decision, the Supreme
Court held that the corroboration of all the elements of the tip except the
conclusion that the suspect was committing the crime of possession of heroin
provided the police with probation cause to arrest the suspect.I 1 In his Spinelli
concurrence, Justice White did not cite Draper for the proposition that police
corroboration alone could satisfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and
thereby satisfy a finding of probable cause.2 Justice White used the facts
94. See supra notes 46-49 (examining rationale of totality of the circumstances approach
in allowing independent police corroboration to buttress inadequate basis of knowledge prong).
95. See State v. Ellington, 18 N.C. App. 273, 276, 196 S.E.2d 629, 632 (court held that
police corroboration of suspects' descriptions, clothes, and suitcases supported inference and in-
formant obtained information through first-hand observation), aff'd, 284 N.C. 198, 200 S.E.2d
177 (1973).
96. 393 U.S. at 426 (White, J., concurring). The Spinelli concurrence cited Draper v. United
States as an example of the amount of detail needed to buttress an inadequate basis of knowledge
prong. Id.; see Draper, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Justice White explicitly differentiated between the
Draper Court's holding and the holding in Spinelli. 393 U.S. at 426. In Spinelli, Justice White
stated that the Draper holding stood for the proposition that independent police corroboration
alone could support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 426-27. Justice White then clearly stated
that the rationale enunciated in Draper did not extend to the Spinelli holding. Id. at 427.
97. 358 U.S. at 309.
98. Id. The specificity of detail in the tip in Draper was extensive. Id. The informant stated
that the suspect was black, five feet eight tall, weighed approximately 160 pounds, and would
be wearing a raincoat, brown pants, and black shoes. Id. The informant further provided that
the suspect would be carrying a tan bag and had a habit of walking very rapidly. Id.
99. Id. In Draper, the informant stated that the suspect would be transporting the heroin
from Chicago to Denver. Id.
100. Id. at 309. At the time of the arrest in Draper, the police found the defendant in posses-
sion of two envelopes containing approximately three ounces of heroin. Id. at 310. Section 7607
of the Internal Revenue Code entitled the police to. dispense with the warrant requirement before
arresting the suspect. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1976) (stating that arrest warrant is not necessary
when probable cause exists to believe that suspect has committed an offense related to narcotics
laws in presence of arresting officer).
101. 358 U.S. at 313, In Draper, the Court held that after police had corroborated every
element of the informant's tip, the police officers reasonably could conclude that the informant's
unverified conclusion that the suspect was in possession of heroin was also true. Id.
102. 393 U.S. at 426-27 (White, J., concurring). In his concurrence to Spinelli, Justice White
expressed strong reservations about the Draper holding. Id. Justice White stated that the cor-
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in Draper as an example of the level of detail needed to cure an inadequate
demonstration of an informant's basis of knowledge. 03 The use of police cor-
roboration in the totality of the circumstances approach therefore is not sup-
ported by Justice White's explanation of the use of police corroboration in
his concurrence to Spinelli.'10 Justice White stressed that police corroboration
alone could not provide a basis for a finding of probable cause because police
corroboration could not support an inference that the informant's uncor-
roborated conclusions were true. 0 5 Courts following the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis, including the Gates Court, however, have reinterpreted
the Draper rationale to allow police corroboration to support a finding of
probable cause.'
0 6
In Stanley v. State'0 ' the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland elaborated
on the Spinelli Court's unwillingness to approve the dual use of police cor-
roboration as both basis of knowledge and veracity evidence. 00 The Stanley
court stated that the purpose of basis of knowledge evidence is to allow the
magistrate to evaluate the source of the tip to determine the accuracy of the
information.0 9 The court further stated the police corroboration, while pro-
bative of the veracity of the informant, did not provide any evidence that
a magistrate could examine to evaluate the source of the tip."0 The Stanley
court proferred an example of an informant who bases his tip on a series
of underworld rumors to demonstrate how a magistrate's use of corrobora-
tion to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong can result in unreasonable searches
and seizures. " I' The Stanley court explained that under the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis a magistrate can base a finding of probable cause on the
roborated facts did not prove the unverified conclusion, but only proved the reliability of the
informant. Id. at 427.
103. Id. at 426 (White, J., concurring).
104. See 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion to Spinelli, Justice
White explicitly stated that police corroboration could not buttress a defective basis of knowledge
prong. Id. Justice White stated that corroboration was unsuitable as basis of knowledge evidence
because the corroboration did not provide evidence that pertained to the informant's methods
for obtaining his information. Id.
105. Id. at 426-27; see infra notes 107-113 (Stanley court's analysis of inapplicability of in-
dependent police corroboration as basis of knowledge evidence).
106. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2334. The Gates Court cited Draper for the rationale that
independent police corroboration could satisfy a finding of probable cause. Id. The findings of
probable cause based on police corroboration in Gates and Draper are analytically different from
determinations of probable cause based on corroboration of innocent details. See Stanley v. State,
19 Md. App. 508, 528, 313 A.2d 847, 860 (1974) (sufficient police corroboration of incriminating
facts in tip may lead to independent probable cause, thus rendering informant's testimony
superflous). In both Draper and Gates, the facts corroborated by the police did not indicate
any criminal activity. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 and 97-100 (corroborated facts
in Draper and Gates).
107. 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847 (1974).
108. Id. at 531-32, 313 A.2d at 861-62 (stating that each Spinelli remedy addresses specific
Aguilar prong, and that particular remedy will not satisfy prong for which it was not designed).
109. Id. at 530, 313 A.2d at 861; see supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (explaining pur-
pose of basis of knowledge requirement).
110. 19 Md. App. at 531-32, 313 A.2d at 862.
111. Id. at 532, 313 A.2d at 862.
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corroboration of one of the rumors. Regardless of a contrary holding in Gates,
police corroboration does not provide a magistrate with adequate evidence
to evaluate accurately the source of the remainder of the rumors. 1 2 The Gates
holding therefore approves unreasonable searches and seizures based on nothing
more substantial than a veracious informant's recounting of underworld
rumor. "1 3
The totality of the circumstances analysis makes the police officer's task
of obtaining a warrant easier by no longer requiring that a magistrate find
satisfactory evidence in both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test."II The Gates
holding, furthermore, potentially has facilitated the task of police by broadening
considerably the totality of the circumstances analysis itself. 5 The traditional
totality of the circumstances analysis permitted a very strong showing in one
prong of the Aguilar test to compensate for an inadequate level of evidence
in the other prong." 6 Although the Gates Court found that magistrates should
consider the totality of the circumstances in determining the existence of prob-
ble cause, the Gates affidavit clearly would have failed under the traditional
totality of the circumstances analysis. ' 7 The Gates Court admitted that the
evidence contained in the warrant affidavit was insufficient to satisfy either
prong of the Aguilar test."' The Gates Court further stated that under the
Spinelli test the tip lacked the specific details necessary to satisfy the basis
of knowledge prong.' 9 Furthermore, the facts concerning the Gates' travel
plans that the police corroborated were insufficient to support a finding of
the informant's veracity,' 2 much less probable cause.I' The Supreme Court's
112. Id. In Stanley, the court stated that police corroboration could prove that the infor-
mant was telling the truth. Id. The court stated, however, that the corroboration could not ensure
the accuracy of any other rumors that the informant had inculcated into the tip. Id. The court
concluded that police corroboration cannot prove that the source of the informant's tip was per-
sonal knowledge or another reliable method of obtaining the information. Id.
113. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 19 (basing of probable cause determination on
mere rumor or general reputation is unconstitutional).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 87-113 (description of situations in which magistrate
may find probable cause under totality of the circumstances analysis when magistrate would not
have found probable cause under severabilityanalysis).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 116-122 (discussing differences between Gates analysis
and traditional totality of the circumstances analysis).
116. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1973) (strong showing in veracity
prong offsets inadequate basis of knowledge evidence), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); supra
text accompanying notes 42-44 (examination of traditional totality of the circumstances analysis).
117. 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
118. Id. at 2334-35.
119. Id. at 2336. The Court in Gates stated that there was a fair probability that the infor-
mant obtained the information in a reliable way. Id. The Court admitted, however, that the
detail of the tip did not permit the clear inference that the informant obtained his information
through personal observation or other reliable source, thereby failing the Spinelli requirement.
Id. at 2327; see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 426 (White, J., concurring) (stating that certain level of
specificity in tip will lead to inference of personal observation, thereby satisfying basis of knowledge
prong).
120. 103 S.Ct. at 2335; see id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent to Gates,
Justice Stevens noted that the informant's tip was partially inaccurate. Id. Justice Stevens stated
that this mistake disproved any claims of the informant's veracity. Id.
121. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the innocuousness of defendant's activities
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finding of probable cause despite both the questionable basis of knowledge
information and dubious veracity evidence therefore constituted a much broader
holding than any totality of the circumstances holding cited by the Gates Court.
The Gates Court's adoption of the totality of the circumstances analysis
increased the potential for an overly permissive standard of probable cause. 22
The judicial standard of review for findings of a magistrate further intensifies
the potential for unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the totality of
the circumstances analysis, the magistrate has broad discretionary powers that
strict judicial review does not temper.'23 Instead, a reviewing court gives great
deference to a magistrate's finding of probable cause.'24 Prior to Gates, the
clearly defined standards of the Aguilar-Spinelli severability analysis counter-
balanced reviewing courts' deferential attitudes.'2 5 The abandonment of the
strict severability analysis, coupled with a court's presumption that a
magistrate's decision is a proper one, leaves magistrates with neither guidance
nor strict judicial supervision.' 6 The Gates holding may lead to disparate,
often inaccurate findings of probable cause based not on a strict constitu-
tional standard, but on the instincts of a single individual. 2 '
The confusion and inconsistency of lower court holdings demanded a
clarification of the Aguilar-Spinelli rule. The Supreme Court, however, erred
in overruling the severability analysis and replacing it with a totality of the
circumstances test. The present totality of the circumstances test is unclear
and may lead to unreasonable and haphazard probable cause determinations
that police corroborated); Stanley, 19 Md. App. 508, 532, 313 A.2d at 847, 862 (facts corroborated
must be incriminating in nature for police corroboration to establish probable cause).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 113-121 (application of totality of the circumstances
analysis to Gates facts).
123. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2333. The Gates Court stated that the totality of the circumstances
analysis increases the role of the magistrate in probable cause determinations. Id. The Court
stated that under the totality of the circumstances analysis the magistrate is free to demand or
ignore the requirements established by Aguilar and Spinelli. Id. The Gates Court concluded that
the totality of the circumstances analysis frees magistrates from the restrictions imposed by the
"labyrinthine body of judicial refinement" of Aguilar and Spinelli. Id.; supra text accompanying
notes 41-60 (comparison of totality of the circumstances and severability analyses).
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2331. The Gates Court stated that judicial review of a magistrate's deter-
mination of probable cause should not consist of a de novo review. Id. Reviewing courts give
great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the magistrate most
closely is acquainted with the facts and therefore is in the best position to make an accurate
determination. See Unites States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 1100, 1106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
965 (1978). The Gates Court cited United States v. Ventresca for the proposition that there is
a strong preference for judicial approval of a magistrate's finding of probable cause. 103 S. Ct.
at 2331; see Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). In Ventresca, the Supreme Court held that
reviewing courts should resolve marginal cases of probable cause in favor of validity of the warrant.
Id. at 109. The Ventresca Court reasoned that a positive attitude by courts toward magistrate's
conclusions of probable cause would encourage police to work within the structures of fourth
amendment requirements and not resort to warrantless searches. Id. at 108.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (discussion of evidentiary elements that con-
stituted probable cause under the severability analysis).
126. 103 S. Ct. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his Gates dissent, Justice Brennan stated
that the totality of the circumstances analysis removed the quidelines that aided a magistrate
in structuring proper probable cause inquiries. Id.
127. Id. at 2359.
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by magistrates. 2 The Supreme Court should reinstate the Aguilar-Spinelli test,
maintaining the severability of the two prongs.' 29 Only through this change
can the Supreme Court ensure a reasonable and consistent standard of probable
cause for warrants based on informants' tips.
STEPHEN LUPARELLO
128. See supra text accompanying notes 87-106 (discussion of potential increase in unreasonable
searches and seizures under Gates totality of the circumstances analysis).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60 (discussion of rationale of severability analysis).
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